Sayed Yaqoob Emad: Syria – Afghanistan 2.0?

Recent developments in Syria have garnered significant global attention, disrupting the international focus on the crises in Ukraine and Gaza. The situation in Syria has prompted scholars and policymakers to draw comparisons with Afghanistan in 2021. While Syria and Afghanistan are distinct in their geopolitical and sociocultural contexts, understanding the parallels requires a critical examination of their ideological underpinnings, external interventions, governance structures, sectarian cleavages, geopolitical alignments, socio-political divergences, gender issues, political institutions, regional interactions, legitimacy (both domestic and international), and resource endowments.

Historical context and origins of the current crisis

Syria’s current trajectory has been likened to Afghanistan’s recent history, although this analysis does not seek to evaluate the outcomes in Afghanistan, but to examine the similarities and differences between the emerging Syria and post-2021 Afghanistan.

The roots of Syria’s crisis lie in the 1980s. In 1982, Hafez Al-Assad’s regime allegedly massacred 10,000–40,000 Sunni civilians in Hama, marking the region’s first documented use of chemical weapons, as reported by human rights organisations. A second wave of instability began in 2011, during the Arab Spring, when the brutal killing of Sunni teenagers for anti-regime graffiti triggered widespread unrest. In response, the Assad regime reportedly committed mass atrocities, imprisoned thousands and displaced millions.

The recent advance of Hay’at Tahrir Al-Sham (HTS) in Syria and the fall of the Bashar Al-Assad regime resembles the Taliban takeover and the swift collapse of Afghanistan’s Ashraf Ghani administration. Just as the Taliban captured Kabul within a week, HTS made comparably rapid territorial gains

This sequence echoes the overthrow of the Najibullah regime in Afghanistan during the 1990s by Mujahideen factions. HTS shares ideological connections with these Mujahideen groups, while Assad’s Ba’athist regime parallels Afghanistan’s former communist administration. Although both HTS and the Taliban announced general amnesties upon assuming power, Syria’s new authorities have yet to enact these promises.

Ideological foundations: Deobandi vs. Salafi/Ikhwan traditions

The ideological foundations of the Taliban and HTS are rooted in divergent Islamic traditions. The Taliban’s ideology is firmly grounded in the Deobandi school, reflecting a conservative, traditionalist interpretation of Islam. Conversely, HTS has no connections or historical ties to the Muslim Brotherhood. The Brotherhood itself has never engaged in military operations in Syria, except for a single battalion that later distanced itself from the group. HTS has evolved over time, transitioning from its roots in Al-Qaeda to a more relatively moderate stance today. In fact, both domestic and exiled Brotherhood leaders are disappointed that HTS leader Ahmed Al-Sharaa has intentionally marginalised their organisation, likely due to concerns over its global influence and experience.

While the Syrian prime minister has some sympathies with the movement, his background is primarily Salafi.

HTS traces its origins back to Al-Qaeda, which emerged initially during the fight against the USSR in Afghanistan before evolving and shifting its focus to the Iraq invasion after 2003. In contrast, the Taliban leadership originally belonged to the Mujahideen or various Jihadi factions that fought against Soviet forces. The term “Taliban” translates to “students” and refers to their roots in Deobandi madrassas. While these Taliban fighters participated in conflicts against both Soviet and later NATO forces, divisions arose following the Mujahideen’s victory in the 1990s, due to various factors, such as the rule of law, anarchy and most importantly foreign interventionists agendas. Unlike the Taliban, who were shaped predominantly by Deobandi teachings, the Jihadi factions were influenced significantly by the ideology of the Muslim Brotherhood (Ikhwan).

Furthermore, HTS has demonstrated comparatively moderate positions on women’s rights, with women participating in governance roles such as cabinet positions and leadership within the central bank. In contrast, the Taliban’s policies reflect rigid adherence to traditionalist gender norms, with restrictions on women’s education and employment. This divergence extends to cultural practices; for instance, HTS leaders, including Al-Sharaa, have adopted Western attire, a stark contrast to the Taliban’s rejection of such practices in favour of traditional Afghan/Pakistani dress.

Governance failures and the role of corruption

Both Assad and Ghani led administrations riddled with systemic corruption that permeated their political, administrative and economic institutions. This corruption eroded public trust and delegitimised their governance, paving the way for HTS in Syria (2024) and the Taliban in Afghanistan (2021) to consolidate power.

Sectarian and ethnic dimensions

Afghanistan and Syria each have significant Shia populations, yet their political trajectories diverge. Afghanistan has historically been governed by Sunni Muslims following the Hanafi school of thought, while Syria’s leadership has been dominated by the Alawite Assad family, which is aligned with Shia Islam but maintains a secular, leftist orientation. The recent ascendancy of Sunni Hanafi Muslims in Syria mirrors Afghanistan’s Sunni-dominated governance, although the stability of this new political arrangement remains uncertain.

In terms of ethnic composition, Syria is predominantly made up of Arabs, Turks and Kurds, with these groups being concentrated geographically in different regions. In contrast, Afghanistan has a more complex ethnic mosaic, where Pashtuns, Tajiks, Hazaras and Uzbeks live in interwoven territories.

Political institutions and legitimacy

Neither Syria nor Afghanistan currently possess functional political party systems. The HTS leadership has indicated that elections in Syria are unlikely for at least four years, while the Taliban regime has banned all political party activity in Afghanistan.

Syria’s new regime has partially restored domestic legitimacy but risks undermining this fragile support if it fails to hold elections as promised. Internationally, Syria is striving to regain recognition after years of isolation. Afghanistan, meanwhile, struggles with both domestic and international legitimacy. Although no popular uprising has occurred against the current government so far, issues such as the closure of girls’ schools, the ban on political parties, the absence of a constitution and the lack of an inclusive council (excluding the young, non-Taliban figures in the Good Will Movement, for example) have led the Taliban government to face a legitimacy crisis. For this reason, it also faces challenges regarding international legitimacy.

While Afghanistan and Syria have distinct differences in historical, ideological, social, and political contexts, they share many parallels in terms of the challenges they face, including fragile economies, crises of legitimacy and immigration.

Flag, geopolitical alignments and regional relations

The flags adopted by HTS and the Taliban reflect their ideological and political narratives. Both employ white flags inscribed with the Islamic declaration of faith in Arabic, the Kalima, but HTS also has another flag from Syrian opposition movements to emphasise national unity, distinguishing its approach from that of the Taliban.

The current Afghanistan aligns more with the Eastern bloc, fostering relations with Russia and China.

In contrast, Syria, under HTS, has pivoted towards Western alliances, particularly with Turkiye, although these partnerships remain tentative due to ongoing hesitations over formal recognition. The roles of neighbouring countries in both cases — Syria’s relations with Turkiye, the Gulf states, Jordan, and Israel, as well as the Taliban’s interactions with Russia, China, Iran, Uzbekistan and Pakistan — are highly complex. Turkiye, the Gulf nations and Jordan have established positive ties with the new Syrian leadership, sending delegations and pledging economic support for reconstruction. However, Israel’s stance remains unclear, despite its bombing of Syria and occupation of some parts of the country. In the early days of the new Syrian administration, the HTS leader specifically warned Iran against interference, but did not address other countries specifically.

Similarly, regional engagement with Afghanistan under Taliban rule has been largely cooperative, but cautious. Pakistan, however, has expressed disappointment due to the presence of Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) within its borders. Other neighbouring countries have pursued economic collaboration, offering substantial financial aid and investing in large-scale projects such as mining and dam construction. Their approach appears to focus on filling the void left by the US withdrawal in 2021. Moreover, regional relations also diverge. Afghanistan’s strained ties with Pakistan and Iran persist, driven by disputes over the Durand Line and water resource allocation. Syria, on the other hand, has resolved historical tensions with Turkiye, but continues to face ideological and sectarian challenges in its relationship with Iran.

Resources and gender policies

Both Syria and Afghanistan possess abundant natural and human resources. Afghanistan is endowed with substantial mineral wealth and water reserves, while Syria’s resources include oil and a rich cultural heritage. Both nations also have predominantly youthful populations, making them potential targets for external exploitation.

On gender issues, Syria’s leadership has taken relatively progressive steps, incorporating women into governance and policymaking roles. In contrast, the Taliban’s governance is characterised by restrictions on women, barring them from most public work and education beyond the primary level.

Potential future threats

The Kurds, backed by the US in northern Syria; Assad’s remaining forces; and Shia groups supported by Iran pose potential challenges to HTS. Among these, the Kurds represent the most significant threat to the new Syrian regime. It’s also important to note that Turkiye, a supporter of HTS, has warned the Kurds to disarm or face military strikes.

As a state and a nation, Turkiye has no specific attitude toward the Kurds living in Syria.

Rather, it opposes the separatist organisation PKK-PYD, which claims to represent the Kurds in Syria and poses a threat to Turkiye.

In Afghanistan, the current acting government faces no substantial threats. Former government leaders and forces lack both domestic and international support due to two decades of corruption, leaving the country to its fate. The Fatimiyoun Brigade, which fled from Syria, could pose a very minor threat to the Taliban administration but is unlikely to have a significant impact on its stability.

Conclusion

Both Syria and Afghanistan have endured decades of conflict, which has exhausted them. They share the burden of hundreds of thousands of refugees, devastated economies and deeply divided societies scarred by mass killings. For lasting peace and prosperity, comprehensive reforms and international support are essential. In Afghanistan, young non-Taliban leaders who stayed in the country after 2021, along with elders uninvolved in governance over the past two decades but enjoying public support, could push for necessary reforms.

The perspective that Syria is or will become like Afghanistan is entirely incorrect.

This view creates a fear that Afghanistan is a dangerous place and that its people are dangerous historically because they have rejected a foreign lifestyle. However, every country and its people have the right to follow their own religious and cultural traditions; it should not be necessary for all nations to be similar in every way.

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While Afghanistan and Syria have distinct differences in historical, ideological, social, and political contexts, they share many parallels in terms of the challenges they face, including fragile economies, crises of legitimacy and immigration. Both regimes struggle to establish national unity under their new regimes and gain international legitimacy. Moreover, issues such as gender equality, political reforms and economic development are critical areas for ensuring a sustainable future for both nations.

Sayed Yaqoob Emad is a former assistant lecturer of International Politics of the Middle East at SOAS University of London. The article was originally published by Middle East Monitor.

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